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One of the most important questions in
economics concerns whether and how changes
in the stock of money affect the levels of output
and employment. More specifically, how can
changes in the stock of a nominal quantity,
such as the number of dollar bills outstanding,
affect the level of a real quantity, such as the
total amount of goods and services produced
in any given year or the number of workers to
be employed in the production of that output?
Given that the Federal Reserve’s primary means
of influencing the pace of economic activity in
the United States is through changes in the
stock of money, the question is of immediate
importance for the conduct of monetary policy.1
Yet despite the importance of this question, it
remains one of the great unsettled issues in
economics. After nearly two hundred years of
theorizing, we still do not have a very clear
understanding of the mechanism whereby
changes in the stock of money affect the
economy in the short run. This article reviews
one of the most popular explanations for why
money affects output. This is the idea that
prices are “sticky” at nonmarket-clearing lev-
els, thus creating the potential for changes in
the money stock to influence the real economy.
The intuition for why changes in the
nominal money stock can affect real output in
a sticky-price environment is straightforward.
Consider a situation in which the economy is in
a state of monetary equilibrium. All individuals
are holding their desired levels of cash bal-
ances, which typically might be expressed in
terms of some number of weeks of income.
Individuals have arrived at these holdings by
trading off their need for cash to facilitate
transactions with the cost of holding cash
rather than some higher yielding asset. Absent
any change in individuals’ need to finance
transactions or the relative return on cash
versus other assets, they will be willing to hold
their existing stocks of cash indefinitely.
Suppose now that the monetary authority
engineers an increase in the money stock such
that each individual’s cash holdings increase by
exactly 10 percent. Suppose also that the increase
is a one-time occurrence, in the sense that it is
unanticipated and will not be repeated. One way
this might occur would be by means of the
metaphorical helicopter drop employed by Milton
Friedman in his analyses of the effects on real
activity of changes in the stock of money.2 On
average, individuals will now find themselves
holding a larger stock of cash than before. Since
their previous level of cash holdings was optimal,
given their transactions needs and the costs of
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holding cash, and since nothing has changed to
alter these determinants of their cash holdings,
individuals, on average, now hold more than their
desired stock of cash. To return to their original
level of money holdings, the individuals will
increase their spending until their cash balances
are back at their original level. However, if all
individuals are simultaneously trying to spend
down their cash balances, and nothing has hap-
pened to make people willing to produce more,
the result will be upward pressure on prices. In
the long run, equilibrium will be restored when
the prices of all goods rise in the same proportion
as the initial increase in the money stock.
 The more difficult question is what hap-
pens during the transition to the new equilibrium.
If the prices of all goods and services increased
immediately in the same proportion as the money
stock, the adjustment would be completed instan-
taneously and that would be the end of the story.
However, if (for whatever reason) some produc-
ers are slow to adjust their prices in the face of the
increase in nominal demand and choose instead
to increase output, we might see an increase in
output during the transition period. This failure to
adjust prices immediately may come about for a
variety of reasons, including, for example, a
misinterpretation on the part of some firms of the
increased demand for their product or the exist-
ence of some menu cost associated with changing
prices. Whatever the reason, the failure of prices
to adjust rapidly generates the potential for changes
in the nominal stock of money to affect real
output.
The focus in this article will be on price
stickiness or rigidity rather than wage stickiness.
Sticky prices or wages are both potential sources
of nonneutralities of money, and both may play a
role in propagating nominal shocks. However,
most economists are skeptical of interpretations
that view the failure of nominal weekly or monthly
wage payments to fluctuate with business condi-
tions as evidence of stickiness. A better interpre-
tation, many argue, is that periodic wage payments
are installment payments on a long-term labor
contract (either implicit or explicit) and thus play
relatively little allocative role (see, for example,
Barro 1977). Incentives other than the promise of
higher wages induce workers to work harder
during booms; one example might be the implicit
promise of being allowed to slack off when things
are quieter. Other reasons for being skeptical
about the importance of wage rigidity as a propa-
gation mechanism are recent evidence that wages
are, in fact, remarkably flexible, and the
counterfactual implications of theories with wage
stickiness at their core.3
The facts about price stickiness
A common criticism of the raw data used to
construct the widely used consumer and pro-
ducer price indexes is that the prices that go into
these indexes are list rather than transactions
prices. That is, the raw price series do not reflect
the prices at which actual transactions take place
but rather some irrelevant list price at which
relatively few transactions occur. Wynne and
Sigalla (1993) review some of the evidence on this
problem. The list-transactions problem takes many
forms, depending on whether the prices in ques-
tion are for intermediate or final goods. Firms may
be reluctant to report actual transactions prices to
the industrial price program that gathers data for
the producer price index (PPI) because of fears
the data may be used in antitrust litigation or fall
into the hands of competitors.4 Thus, some have
argued that price data should be collected from
buyers rather than sellers.
This approach is nearly what is done in the
data collection of prices for the consumer price
index (CPI). Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
reporters visit a variety of stores and collect data
on the various products that are to be priced for
the CPI. The reporters make adjustments to these
products for some but not all discounts. Thus,
when pricing automobiles, the BLS collects the
car’s sticker price; the average discount offered
over the recent past; and the prices for standard
options, dealer preparation, and delivery to get a
measure of car prices that better approximates the
prices the average consumer actually pays. One
form of discounting that is not taken into account
in collecting data for the CPI involves cents-off
coupons. The BLS only discounts products for
those coupons attached to products for redemp-
tion at the time of sale. Clearly, the use of coupons
could imply greater price flexibility than is re-
vealed in examinations of the official price statis-
tics, but by how much is uncertain. It is clear,
however, that coupon use varies with the state of
economic activity.
One other aspect of the official price in-
dexes makes them unsuitable for assessing the
overall degree of flexibility of the price of a
product. That is, for a variety of reasons, the prices
that go onto the official indexes are usually
averages of prices obtained from different outlets
or firms. Such averages can fluctuate either more
or less than their constituent price series, making
them unreliable guides to the overall flexibility of
prices. Despite these shortcomings of official
price statistics, the first study I review (Mills 1927)
is based on an analysis of raw BLS data. The
review of the literature begins with this study
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remains one of the most comprehensive assess-
ments of price flexibility, and it also establishes
certain results about the frequency of price changes
that later studies confirm.
The behavior of wholesale
prices, 1890–1924
The earliest study of the frequency of price
changes for individual products is probably Mills
(1927). Mills studied data collected by the BLS for
the purposes of constructing the wholesale price
index (WPI) and constructed a measure of the
frequency of price changes for an individual
commodity by dividing the number of months in
which a change in price is recorded by the total
number of months for which a price is quoted,
less one. Thus, if we have price data for, say,
wheat for a ten-year period (120 months), and if
in 119 of those months the price changed, then
the index would take on a value of one (119/119).
Alternatively, if there were no price changes over
the ten-year period, the index would take on a
value of zero (0/119). Mills constructs this mea-
sure for each of the 206 commodities in his data
set for six different periods. The resulting class
frequencies are plotted in Figure 1. The value of
Mills’ index is plotted in interval increments on the
horizontal axis, while the frequency of each
interval value is plotted on the vertical axis. If
every product in the sample exhibited a price
change in every month of a particular sample
period, the rightmost bar on the graph would
equal 206 (the number of commodities in the
sample), with zeros elsewhere. Likewise, if no
commodity exhibited a price change during any
month of the sample, all the mass of the distribu-
Figure 1
Distribution of 206 Commodities
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tion would be concentrated in the leftmost bar on
the graph, with zeros everywhere else.
The most striking feature of these graphs is
the uniformity of the U-shaped distribution of
price changes. That is, there are a lot of products
for which prices change relatively infrequently,
and there are a lot of products for which prices
change frequently. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
only products with an index value of one in all the
sample periods are farm products (hogs and
sheep). For a lot of other products, prices change
almost every month (that is, index values for these
products are close to one). Another point to note
about Figure 1 is how the distribution of price
changes shifted during the period including the
years of World War I (1914–21).
While Mills’ results are of great interest,
there are at least two important problems with the
data he uses. First, despite his claims that the data
are not averages, it is not clear that this is the case.
Examination of Table 1 of the appendix to his
book reveals many commodities for which it
seems likely that the data used are, in fact,
averages over several price quotations. The sec-
ond problem is that data collected for the BLS’s
industrial price program have often been criti-
cized as reflecting list prices rather than transac-
tions prices. Both the Stigler report (NBER 1961)
and the Ruggles report (U.S. Executive Office of
the President: Council on Wage and Price Stability
1977) make this point forcefully. Finally, some of
the criticisms of later studies that will be noted
below are probably also applicable to Mills’ study.
Specifically, adjustment for quality change was
essentially nonexistent in the early years of the
BLS, which raises the possibility that some of the
price stickiness found by Mills may have been
accompanied by quality deteriorations.
The newsstand prices of magazines. Cecchetti’s
(1986) study of the newsstand prices of maga-
zines is probably the most widely cited and
influential piece of evidence that prices are sticky.
Cecchetti looked at the prices of thirty-eight
magazines over the period 1953 to 1979. One
virtue of this data set is that the prices are known
to be transactions prices rather that just list prices.
The use of discounts for newsstand magazine
purchases is rare.5 The main stylized facts about
price stickiness presented by Cecchetti are shown
in Figure 2. Two points are noteworthy. First, the
prices of the magazines in the sample change
relatively infrequently. At most, only half the
magazines in the sample change price in any one
year (the peak year being 1974). Second, note the
increased frequency of price changes and decline
in the average number of years since the last price
change as inflation accelerated in the late 1970s.
Cecchetti also observes that the average decline in
real price between nominal price changes in-
creased dramatically during the 1970s. He inter-
prets this as evidence of “incredible” price
stickiness, which can only be explained by high
fixed costs of price changes.
Nevertheless, the Cecchetti study raises
numerous questions that undermine the broader
inferences that can be drawn from it. For a start,
one has to note the small size of the sample of
prices studied. Cecchetti himself concedes that a
mere one-third of all magazine sales in his sample
are single-copy (newsstand) sales. Most people
buy magazines through subscriptions. What do
we know about the prices of magazines pur-
chased through subscriptions? Obviously, when
one enters a subscription for a magazine, one
obtains (typically) a year’s worth of issues of the
magazine at some fixed average price over the
period of the subscription. Yet frequently maga-
zines offer various discounts for subscribing,
either in the form of “professional courtesy”
discounts or reduced rates for longer subscription
periods.6
A potentially more serious shortcoming of
the Cecchetti study is the absence of any control
for quality. In view of Blinder’s recent survey
findings (discussed below), one wonders whether
magazine publishers effectively raise the price of
their magazines by changing such aspects of
product quality as the publication’s size, the ratio
of advertising to nonadvertising pages, or the
number of color versus black-and-white pages.
Are stockouts at newsstands more common as the
real price of magazines declines with rising infla-
tion?7
This is essentially the point Koelln and Rush
(1993) make. Echoing an earlier argument by
Carlton (1983), Koelln and Rush note that maga-
zine publishers may alter some aspect of their
Figure 2
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product’s quality to adjust the effective price
during the period between nominal price changes.
Koelln and Rush specifically identify the possibil-
ity of altering the number of pages of text as a
potential means of offsetting declines in real price
during the interval between price changes. Koelln
and Rush look at “net page” and price data over
the 1950–89 period for seven magazines (five of
which were included in Cecchetti’s sample). The
authors note that the magazine with the most
inflexible size over this period also had by far
the largest number of nominal price changes.
They interpret this observation as supporting the
hypothesis that variation in quality (magazine
size, in this case) is a potentially important alter-
native to variation in price. Koelln and Rush also
find a statistically significant (positive) relation-
ship between the number of text pages in a
magazine and the real price of the magazine. That
is, as inflation erodes the real price of a magazine
during the interval between nominal price changes,
the number of text pages tends to decline. Koelln
and Rush conclude that the price rigidity Cecchetti’s
study uncovered is significantly overstated.8
A third potential objection to Cecchetti’s
findings has to do with potential sample selection
bias. Since the primary objective of Cecchetti’s
study was to investigate the determinants of the
frequency of nominal prices changes, he explic-
itly chose to study prices that were not deter-
mined in auction markets but rather were known
a priori to remain fixed for relatively long periods.
Thus, Cecchetti (1986, 256) notes that the news-
stand prices of magazines “exhibit the desired
property of discrete and infrequent adjustment”
(emphasis added). This, of course, raises the
question of how representative the sample of
prices Cecchetti examined is of all prices in the
economy.
The prices of industrial commodities. Carlton (1986)
revisits the data collected by Stigler and Kindahl
(1970) in their monumental study of the behavior
of industrial prices. Part of the objective of the
Stigler–Kindahl study is to collect accurate data
on transactions rather than list prices for industrial
commodities. As noted above, it has long been
suspected that the aggregate price indexes the
BLS publishes are based on list rather than trans-
actions prices. To get around the list–transactions
price problem, Stigler and Kindahl collect data
from buyers rather than sellers, the presumption
being that buyers have less of an incentive to
report list rather than transactions prices than do
sellers.9 Stigler and Kindahl also make corrections
for discounting and for changes in product speci-
fication. Their sample period is January 1, 1957,
through December 31, 1966.
The commodities for which price data were
collected were intermediate products used in
manufacturing and were preselected to satisfy
two important criteria. First, Stigler and Kindahl
focus on the prices of those commodities “for
which the charge of inflexible prices has been
heard most frequently” (Stigler and Kindahl 1970,
23). The reason for this focus is the authors’
interest in testing certain theories of administered
prices. Thus, the prices they collected were
preselected to exhibit some degree of price rigid-
ity. Stigler and Kindahl’s second criterion for price
data is the absence of rapid quality change in the
products, which helps avoid the difficulty of
disentangling quality from price changes. Stigler
and Kindahl note that “the problem of measuring
change in the quality of products is the major
unresolved task of all price collection” (Stigler and
Kindahl 1970, 23), and this remains as true today
as it was when they wrote their book twenty-five
years ago.
Carlton concludes on the basis of his analy-
sis of the Stigler–Kindahl data that there is signifi-
cant price rigidity in many industries. For industries
like steel, chemicals, and cement, Carlton finds
that prices are, on average, unchanged for more
than one year. Furthermore, there is a positive
correlation between price rigidity and the size of
price changes. In other words, the longer prices
are rigid, the greater the eventual price change.
But just as there are many examples of products
and transactions for which prices remain fixed for
long periods, so too are there many instances of
small price changes (meaning a change of less
than 1 percent). This observation suggests that
either the costs of changing price are very small
or that the costs of being at the wrong price are
very high. With either explanation, the observa-
tion of long periods of price rigidity is difficult to
explain. Interestingly, Carlton finds a negative
relationship between price rigidity and the length
of association between buyers and sellers, mak-
ing an installment payment interpretation of the
observed price rigidity implausible. Finally, Carlton
finds no evidence that prices downward are more
rigid than upward.
Of all the studies of price flexibility, the
Carlton–Stigler–Kindahl study is the most com-
prehensive in that it looks at the prices of the
largest number of products. Nevertheless, the
findings need to be interpreted with caution. As
noted, Stigler and Kindahl’s preselection criteria
make the prices of the products they study
unrepresentative of prices of all products. An-
other point to note about Carlton’s results is that
during the period covered by his data, WPI
inflation averaged only 1.1 percent a year.10 It6
would be interesting to have a study as compre-
hensive as the Stigler–Kindahl exercise repeated
for a period of higher inflation.
Prices in retail catalogs. The most recent study
documenting the behavior of transactions prices
is Kashyap (1991). Kashyap looks at the behavior
of the transactions prices of twelve retail goods
over the period 1953 to 1987 from the retail
catalogs of three firms: L. L. Bean, Inc.; The Orvis
Company, Inc.; and Recreational Equipment, Inc.
(REI). Kashyap sidesteps the problem of dealing
with quality change by looking only at the prices
of products that are homogeneous over long
periods. The specific products are a pair of
hunting boots, pair of moccasins, chamois shirt,
blanket, and duffel bag from L. L. Bean; a bamboo
fly rod, fly, poplin fishing hat, pair of binoculars,
chamois shirt, and blanket from Orvis; and a
chamois shirt from REI. All three of the companies
in the study fix their prices for six-month inter-
vals, implying that there are at most two price
changes that can be observed each year. Kashyap
collected data by copying prices from old cata-
logs. Prices are list prices for one unit of an item:
no account is taken of discounts for bulk pur-
chases that each company has occasionally
offered. Kashyap provides no data on the size
of these discounts (he simply asserts that they
are “very slight”) or on their frequency. He also
ignores “sales prices which may have been
available for very short periods” (Kashyap 1991,
6–7).11 One key advantage of Kashyap’s data over
that analyzed by Cecchetti is that the goods are
high-volume goods for which even small changes
in price produce nontrivial changes in revenue.
By contrast, subscriptions and advertising are far
more important sources of revenue for magazine
publishers than are newsstand sales.
Kashyap draws three main conclusions from
his empirical analysis:
1. Nominal prices are typically fixed for
periods longer than one year, and the
time between price changes is very
irregular.
2. Prices change more often during periods
of high inflation but not by larger amounts
than during periods of low inflation.
3. When prices do change, the sizes of the
changes are widely dispersed.
Kashyap notes that his data strongly contra-
dict simple versions of (S,s) pricing models. For
example, the simple versions of these models that
assume that price changes should always be in
one direction are rejected by the frequency of
price reductions. Two-sided (S,s) models that
keep the size of the change in each direction fixed
are rejected by the finding that the size of price
changes, when they do occur, is highly variable.
Furthermore, the absence of any correlation be-
tween the average size of price changes and the
(core) rate of inflation poses serious problems for
simple tractable versions of (S,s) models.12
Kashyap addresses the possibility that cata-
log prices might be suspected of being artificially
sticky by citing Rees’ (1961) finding that catalog
prices tend to closely track prices in retail outlets.
However, Rees (1961, 138) explicitly notes the
following:
There is a problem in the determina-
tion of the period during which catalog
prices are in effect. Special sales and in some
cases price increases may be announced
shortly after catalogs are issued, and we
have no collection of such announcements.
Changes in the proportion of all sales made
through special sales catalogs and changes
in the difference between general catalog
and sales catalog prices could introduce
bias into our indexes.
Furthermore, the sample of products Rees exam-
ined was in no sense random. Specifically, the
sample of goods Rees looked at was a judgment
sample of nondurable goods, although he made
a deliberate effort to include both goods that were
little influenced by innovation or technical change
over the sample period and goods that were
subject to significant quality changes. It would be
interesting to know whether today, with the
growth of catalog shopping, Rees’ results still hold
up. The problem remains that the products Rees
looked at are not in any sense representative of
the wide range of products consumers typically
buy. As for the possibility of changes in delivery
lags as prices become more out of line, Kashyap
asserts that since most of the products in his
sample are popular and have been carried by the
different retailers for long periods, the retailers
have a good sense of what demand for the
products looks like, thus rendering stockouts less
common.
Evidence from interviews. Blinder (1991) pro-
posed interviewing actual price setters in business
firms to gain insights into the factors that underlie
decisions to change prices. The primary objective
of Blinder’s study was to find evidence that would
allow us to discriminate between competing
theories of price stickiness, rather than document
how frequently the firms in his sample changed
their prices. Blinder notes that testing the notion
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price stickiness usually means nothing more than
that prices change less rapidly than their unob-
servable Walrasian market-clearing values. While
Blinder does not report raw data on price changes
for the firms in his survey, he does report two
findings relevant to this survey of the literature.
First, most firms in Blinder’s sample (55 percent)
claim to change their prices no more than once a
year, with only 10 percent of companies changing
price as often as once a month. Blinder interprets
this observation as evidence of significant price
rigidity. Of even more importance in the interpre-
tation of this result is the finding that three-fourths
of the sample firms, when asked to rank the
underlying factors in their decision not to change
prices when demand is high or low, said they
changed some other aspect or quality of their
product instead. Specifically, 76 percent of the
firms in the sample accepted the notion that
delivery lags could be lengthened or quality of
auxiliary service reduced as alternatives to raising
prices when demand is tight.13 These findings
echo Carlton’s earlier hypothesis that price may
be only one of several mechanisms firms use to
allocate output and raise serious questions about
the interpretation of observed nominal rigidities.
Assessment of the evidence
In assessing the evidence on price sticki-
ness, one cannot help but be struck by the
scant documentation of how frequently prices
actually change. I have been able to find only
three studies (Cecchetti, Carlton, and Kashyap)
that make a serious attempt to document price
stickiness in the postwar United States. Al-
though this review of the literature includes the
earlier work by Mills, his is probably the most
suspect study cited.
Another striking aspect of price stickiness
documentation is the very small fraction of gross
domestic product (GDP) it covers. It is remarkable
that Cecchetti’s results on the newsstand prices of
magazines should receive such widespread atten-
tion in view of the trivial fraction of GDP those
sales represent.14 The most comprehensive of the
modern studies is Carlton (1986), but the products
in that study were all intermediate rather than final
goods. However, Ball and Mankiw (1994) argue
that when it comes to assessing the importance of
sticky prices as an explanation for monetary
neutrality, it is necessary only that those goods
purchased with money (by which they seem to
mean currency) exhibit stickiness, since the prices
of goods bought with credit do not directly affect
the demand for money. Ball and Mankiw note that
goods purchased with currency are typically
small retail items (such as newspapers and hair-
cuts) and that experience suggests these are the
goods for which prices are most sticky.
The third observation about the evidence is
that, in many cases, the sample of prices studied
is biased toward the inclusion of prices that were
known a priori to be relatively inflexible. Thus,
Cecchetti was primarily interested in estimating
models of price adjustment rather than docu-
menting facts about price changes when he
compiled his data on the newsstand prices of
magazines. Likewise, Stigler and Kindahl were
primarily interested in testing theories of admin-
istered pricing (and thus biased their sample
toward products for which administered [or rigid]
prices were thought to be particularly prevalent)
when they assembled the price data later ana-
lyzed by Carlton (1986). Finally, despite Kashyap’s
citing earlier work by Rees (1961) that found that
prices in catalogs tend to mimic prices at retail
outlets remarkably well, the fact remains that
there is potentially a lot more flexibility in catalog
prices than Kashyap documented.15
Another way in which the prices docu-
mented as being relatively sticky fail to represent
all products is the homogeneity of the docu-
mented products over time. Because of the diffi-
culty of separating price changes due to changes
in the quality of a product from pure price
changes, most of the studies focus only on
products for which this is not likely to be a
problem. Thus, the Stigler–Kindahl data set con-
tains a lot of low-tech products like steel and
lumber, and Kashyap focuses on consumer goods
like shirts and shoes that exhibit little or no quality
changes over time. But the fact remains that many
high-tech products have remarkably flexible prices.
Would anyone seriously suggest that the appro-
priate (quality-adjusted) prices of personal com-
puters stay fixed for very long? Indeed, durable
goods in general tend to have very flexible prices,
as witnessed by the frequent sales for electronic
equipment. Returning to the more basic end of the
consumer products spectrum, food prices (espe-
cially those of fresh fruit and vegetables) fluctuate
in line with market conditions.16 As for services,
barbers may not change the price of a haircut very
often, but the same cannot be said for airfares.
Carlton (1983) raised an important point
concerning the interpretation of findings that the
prices of some or many products are sticky or
inflexible. He notes that the observation that the
price of a product is inflexible for long periods is
meaningless if the product changes over time.
The specific example he considered was one in
which delivery lags could be lengthened in lieu of
raising price when demand is tight. As evidence
for the potential importance of this mechanism for8
allocating output, Table 1 shows the standard
deviations of price and delivery lags in selected
industries. In each case, delivery lags are more
variable than price, in some cases considerably
so. But Carlton’s point applies more generally and
to aspects of the product other than time to
delivery. Thus, to note that the price of a maga-
zine stays fixed for, say, a year is not very
interesting if the magazine changes its ratio of
advertising to text during the year. Koelln and
Rush (1993) note such a possibility in connection
with Cecchetti’s study of magazine prices. Simi-
larly, to note that the price of a piece of apparel
stays fixed for a long period is not very informa-
tive if instead the fabric content of the item
changes. Indeed, just such a phenomenon oc-
curred during WWII when price controls held the
nominal price of various consumer goods con-
stant. Manufacturers skirted these price controls
and effectively raised prices by lowering the
quality of the goods.17 Blinder’s interview study
lends further credence to this possibility with the
finding that most firms in his sample accepted that
changes in delivery lags or other aspects of the
product were a common alternative to nominal
price increases.
While these studies document many cases
in which prices stay fixed for long periods, they
also find many instances in which prices are very
flexible, changing frequently and often by small
amounts. The earliest evidence on this is the U-
shaped distributions plotted by Mills for whole-
sale prices in the pre-World War II period. Carlton
also finds many instances of frequent and small
price changes in the Stigler–Kindahl data set, and
Blinder observes that about 10 percent of the
firms in his sample change their prices as often as
once a month.
Finally, there is evidence that price changes
are more frequent during periods of high inflation
than during periods of low inflation. This is one
of the main findings of Cecchetti’s study, and is
also reported by Kashyap. Additional evidence on
the frequency of price adjustment during periods
of high inflation in Israel is presented in Sheshinski,
Tishler, and Weiss (1981); Lach and Tsiddon
(1992); and Eden (1994). The importance of this
result is that it demonstrates that firms’ pricing
policies are not unresponsive to changes in the
environment. Thus, a monetary policy aimed at
stabilizing output and predicated on the notion
that price changes occur at fixed intervals would
be based on a false assumption.
Blinder (1991, 1990) writes that attempts to
test the notion that prices are sticky are hindered
by the ambiguity of the terms “sticky” and “flex-
ible.” To say that prices are sticky often means no
more than that they are less flexible or adjust less
rapidly than Walrasian market-clearing prices.
However, this is a rather amorphous benchmark,
since Walrasian market-clearing prices are them-
selves unobservable. Of course, the sensible thing
to do then is to test the other predictions of the
theory. Do models with sticky prices do a better
job at explaining business cycles that do models
with perfect price flexibility?
Ball and Mankiw (1994, 35–36) note that “A
scientific theory should be judged not only by the
intrinsic appeal of its assumptions, but also by its
ability to explain observed facts—especially ones
that it was not explicitly designed to explain.” In
view of the scant evidence on price rigidity and
the inherent difficulties in augmenting such evi-
dence as there is, perhaps the best way to assess
the quantitative importance of price rigidities for
understanding fluctuations in economic activity is
to compare the performance of models with price
rigidities with that of models with fully flexible
prices to see which does better in explaining the
stylized facts of the business cycle.
Cho and Cooley (1990) explore the quanti-
tative implications of nominal price contracts (or
sticky prices) for the transmission and propaga-
tion of shocks in a standard business-cycle model.
The model they study is a variant of the one-
sector, neoclassical growth model augmented
with a cash-in-advance constraint. They study the
effects of nominal price contracts that vary in
length from one to eight periods on the propaga-
tion of both monetary and technology shocks,
with prices set each period on the basis of
expected marginal costs. Cho and Cooley show
that only a small amount of price stickiness is
needed in their model to generate output volatil-
ity of the same magnitude as observed in the U.S.
data. Monetary shocks propagated by nominal
Table 1
Price and Delivery Lag Fluctuations
Standard Standard
deviation deviation Median
of log of log of delivery lag
SIC code Industry of price delivery lag in months
22 Textile mill products .06 .17 1.26
26 Paper and allied products .05 .08 .46
331 Steel .03 .25 1.95
34 Fabricated metals .03 .18 3.06
35 Nonelectrical machinery .04 .25 3.63
36 Electrical machinery .05 .10 3.86
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price stickiness for a small number of products
thus may be an important element in furthering
our understanding of the business cycle under
certain price-setting rules. However, nominal
shocks by themselves propagated by nominal
contracts are not a viable alternative to technol-
ogy shocks as a source of business cycles: while
monetary shocks propagated by nominal con-
tracts can generate output volatility of the right
order of magnitude, other features of such a
model are inconsistent with the facts of U.S.
business cycles.
The consequences of price stickiness in a
general equilibrium model have also been inves-
tigated by Ohanian and Stockman (1994a, b), who
examine an economy in which some prices are set
in advance and some are free to change instanta-
neously. Prices in the sticky-price sector are
assumed to be set at their expected market-
clearing level. Ohanian and Stockman show that
only a small degree of price stickiness may be
sufficient to generate big effects from nominal
shocks. However, as the model studied by Ohanian
and Stockman abstracts from capital accumula-
tion, it is not clear how robust their results are. In
particular, the inclusion of capital accumulation
would introduce an additional margin along which
substitution could occur in response to exog-
enous disturbances, necessitating the existence of
a larger sticky price sector to generate plausible
liquidity effects. Just how much larger is an open
question.
A key shortcoming of the Cho–Cooley and
Ohanian–Stockman analyses is that they graft ad
hoc price-setting rules onto otherwise standard
general equilibrium models. Beaudry and
Devereux (1993) overcome this problem by ex-
amining a model in which intermediate goods-
producing firms find it optimal to preset prices,
and do so in a way that maximizes expected
profits.18 Beaudry and Devereux find that their
model is able to match key features of the data
reasonably well, in the sense that the impulse
responses computed for the model for monetary
and technology shocks are similar to those gener-
ated by U.S. data. In particular, the endogenously
sticky prices generate a quantitatively important
propagation mechanism for nominal shocks.
In contrast to the studies just mentioned, the
results of Kydland (1991) suggest that sticky
prices may have little role to play in explaining
output fluctuations. Kydland finds that an equilib-
rium business-cycle model with price flexibility
can account for about two-thirds of the fluctua-
tions in output and the price level as a response
to technology shocks alone. All movements in the
price level come about as a result of real shocks;
there are no fluctuations in the money stock.
Since prices in the real world are more volatile
than prices in the model, sticky prices may
explain little about the remaining one-third of
volatility that cannot stem from technology shocks
alone.
Conclusions
The notion that nominal price rigidities play
an important role in the transmission and propa-
gation of nominal shocks to the real economy is
one of the oldest ideas in economics, dating back
at least to the work of David Hume in the
eighteenth century. In this article, I make two
points about this literature. First, despite its wide-
spread acceptance among economists, there is
remarkably little evidence to support the notion
that prices are sticky. The only way to determine
how frequently prices change is to collect and
examine data on the prices paid in individual
product transactions. To date, I have been able to
uncover only three studies that document the
frequency of price adjustment in the U.S. economy.
Given the importance of price stickiness to much
of contemporary macroeconomic thinking, one
would have thought that there would be a lot
more evidence to support this assumption.
My second major point in this article is that
the evidence, in many cases, must be interpreted
with caution. If buyers and sellers are able to alter
product characteristics other than price to arrive
at market-clearing outcomes, it is not clear that
the observation that posted prices are sticky
implies a role for interventionist policy. If private
markets are achieving efficient outcomes with-
out the aid of the government, the government
would do best by doing nothing. Carlton (1989)
concludes his survey of how markets clear with
this comment:
The importance of price diminishes
once one recognizes that price alone may
not be clearing markets and, instead, that
price in conjunction with other mecha-
nisms, such as a seller’s knowledge of a
buyer’s needs, is performing that function.
Indeed, if price is not the sole mechanism
used to allocate goods, it becomes less
interesting to observe whether price re-
mains rigid. Although a rigid price does
imply inefficiency under any of the simple
models in which price alone is the exclusive
mechanism used to achieve efficient re-
source allocation, a rigid price does not
imply inefficiency in a world in which price
is but one of the many methods firms are
using to allocate goods to customers.10
Despite the caveats about evidence of price
stickiness, it may well be that only a small degree
of genuine price stickiness is needed for nominal
or monetary shocks to generate a quantitatively
significant role as a source of business cycles. The
recent results of Cho and Cooley and Ohanian
and Stockman are particularly suggestive in this
regard. Can models that assume nominal rigidities
are an optimal response to some aspect of the
economic environment reproduce the key facts of
the U.S. business cycle? The question remains
open.
Even if prices are fully flexible, this does not
imply that monetary policy has no role in affecting
the level of output. Sticky prices are only one
mechanism whereby changes in the stock of
nominal money can affect the real economy.
Recent literature has sought to explain the real
effects of monetary policy by invoking the notion
of market incompleteness. Thus, the outcome of
the debate on whether sticky prices matter for
understanding business cycles may have little to
do with how effectively the Federal Reserve can
contribute to smoothing the business cycle.
Notes
This article originated in a set of comments on
“A Sticky-Price Manifesto” by Laurence Ball and N.
Gregory Mankiw, presented at the Second Annual
Texas Conference on Monetary Economics. I am
grateful to reviewers John Duca, Evan Koenig, and
Carlos Zarazaga for comments. I also thank Peter
Hartley and Finn Kydland for useful comments.
1 The Fed also influences the level of economic activity
through changes in reserve requirements. Such
changes affect the real opportunities for borrowing
and lending and are thus considered more likely to
have an influence on real economic activity.
2 See, for example, chapter 2 of Friedman (1992).
3 See, for example, Gordon (1990), who notes that only
price stickiness is needed to generate cycles in real
output, given a path of nominal aggregate demand.
Gordon adds that price flexibility is fully consistent with
nominal wage rigidity as long as profits are sufficiently
flexible.
4 Foss (1993) discusses how the threat of antitrust
litigation discourages accurate reporting of transac-
tions prices by firms.
5 Although not anymore: it is now quite common for
bookstores to offer discounts of 10 percent on the
purchase of books or magazines when the customer
joins the store’s “frequent buyer” program.
6 For example, the average price per issue of The
Economist is lower for a two-year subscription than for
a one-year subscription.
7 It is worth noting that insofar as changes in the real
characteristics of a product result from nominal
shocks, this supports the notion that money does have
an effect on real output, even though prices, when
properly measured, may be completely flexible.
8 Koelln and Rush also note that advertising further
complicates the interpretation of sticky magazine
prices. Insofar as revenue from advertising is more
important to the magazine publisher than revenue
from newsstand sales, the appropriate interpretation
of observed sticky cover prices is not clear. The
authors note that prior to the inclusion of advertising in
Reader’s Digest in 1956, the number of pages in each
issue had declined in several steps from 180 pages in
January 1950 to 168 pages in January 1955. To limit
the complications introduced by advertising, Koelln
and Rush focus on magazines for which they think
advertising is relatively unimportant.
9 Stigler and Kindahl do, in fact, find that their measures
of transactions prices were substantially more flexible
than the BLS price indexes.
10 CPI inflation averaged 1.8 percent a year over the
same period.
11 Kashyap also ignores any postage and handling
charges. He claims that this factor is less serious than
it might seem, as all Bean prices include these charges,
and the Bean prices can be used to establish all the
results reported in the study.
12 Simple menu-cost arguments cannot explain the
infrequency of price changes in catalogs. The menu
cost in such a case is just the cost of printing the
catalog, and this cost is the same whether none or all
of the prices change.
13 Again, the question relevant to an understanding of
potential transmission or propagation mechanisms for
monetary policy is whether “tight” demand can result
from a nominal shock. See note 8.
14 The closest way to assess the relative importance of
magazine sales in GDP is to look at the ratio of con-
sumer spending in the category “Magazines, news-
papers, and sheet music” to GDP. Over the period
covered by Cecchetti’s study, spending in this cate-
gory amounted to less than one-half of 1 percent of
GDP (0.41 percent to be precise)!
15 It is also worth asking how representative catalog sales
are of all retail sales in terms of the demographics of
the buyers. One suspects that most catalog sales
covered in Kashyap’s study were to relatively pros-
perous consumers with relatively high opportunity
costs of time.
16 Levi, Bergen, and Dutta (1994) look at the price of
selected brands of orange juice in a retail outlet and
find that the prices of some brands change, on
average, every two weeks.
17 For a discussion of quality deterioration in connection
with price controls during wartime, see Rockoff (1984).
18 Ireland (1994) also shows that in an economy in which
some firms must set prices one period in advance, the
optimal pricing rule does not equate the preset priceFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 11 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 1995
with expected marginal costs, except when shocks are
serially uncorrelated.
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